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ABSTRACT:  The industrialization of agriculture not only alters the ways in which agricultural 
production occurs, but also impacts the decisions farmers make in important ways.  First, 
constraints created by the economic environment of farming limit what options a farmer has 
available to him.  Second, because of the industrialization of agriculture and the resulting 
economic pressures it creates for farmers, the fact that decision are constrained creates new 
ethical challenges for farmers.  Having fewer options when faced with severe economic 
pressures is a very different situation for farmers than having many options available.  We 
discuss the implications of constrained choice and show that it increases the likelihood that 
farmers will consider unethical behavior.  
 
 
                                                 
*
 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2004 meetings of the Agriculture, Food and Human Values 
Society (AFHVS). 
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I. Introduction 
We are interested in how the industrialization of agriculture has altered the ways in which 
agricultural production occurs and the ways these new production systems impact farmer- level 
decision-making in ethically important ways.  First, constraints created by the economic 
environment of farming limit what options a farmer has available to him.  For example, poultry 
production contracts restrict the abilities of producers to adopt alternative production practices, 
such as production techniques that are environmentally friendly (Hinrichs and Welsh 2003).  
Thus, producers who otherwise would have adopted environmentally-friendly production 
practices are restricted from doing so.  Similarly, the genetic modification of seeds coupled with 
restrictive licensing requirements imposed by technology companies limits the ability of farmers 
to practice traditional farming activities, such as saving seeds or cross-breeding plants to develop 
seed varieties that are efficient for local environmental conditions.  Moreover, because the use of 
GM seeds is becoming more prominent in agriculture, the distribution outlets for farmers who 
choose not to plant GM seeds are being limited, thus constraining how non-GM farmers are able 
to market their crops.  We discuss the ethical implications of such constraints created by the 
industrialization within the agricultural system. 
Second, because of the industrialization of agriculture and the resulting economic 
pressures it creates for farmers, the fact that decisions are constrained creates new ethical 
challenges for farmers.  Having fewer options when faced with severe economic pressures is a 
very different situation for farmers than having many options available.  We argue that growing 
constraints in decision-making, coupled with increases in the economic pressures farmers face, 
will cause an erosion on the ethical attitudes and behaviors of farmers.  We discuss evidence that 
    2 
the ethics of farmers is eroding and explain how the erosion of farmer ethics is explained in part 
by their inability to make the types of decisions farmers made in the past. 
 
II. The Competitive Market place for Farmers  
Industrialization, characterized by standardization, mass production and specialization, 
has been progressing the entire 20th century in most economic sectors of the U.S. economy. 
However, while it did not really became visible in agriculture until after the Second World War, 
it progressed rapidly the second half of the century. “California Agriculture” – the production of 
vegetables under contract – showed the first signs of industrialization in the first half of the 
century.  The process became most apparent in animal agriculture in the production of broilers in 
the late 1950s – characterized by production contracts and vertical integration. Increasingly 
broilers were removed from open markets because the stages of feed production, broiler 
production and broiler processing came under control of the same firm. Industrial size processing 
facilities focused on mass production and a global marketing network required a huge amount of 
capital. This led to the development of large, well- financed corporations and a growing 
concentration of capital and control in the food and agricultural system.  Those responsible for 
the actual production of food products – farmers, farmer workers, and food processing workers – 
have been increasingly deskilled in the process, removing more and more decisions from the 
actual point of production. 
 
II.1. Concentration in agriculture from genes to markets 
At the University of Missouri, Heffernan, Hendrickson, and Gronski (1999) have tracked 
changes in markets for major Midwestern agricultural commodities since the mid-1980s.  Almost 
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all markets, except ethanol, have become increasingly concentrated. When four or fewer firms 
control 40 percent or more of an industry’s market, that sector loses characteristics of a 
competitive market. 
Today’s U.S. farmers face concentrated markets for both their inputs (seeds and 
chemicals) and their products (crops and livestock).  Five firms dominate the genetics for most of 
the crops that are grown world-wide – Bayer (after acquiring Aventis), Monsanto, DuPont 
(owner of Pioneer), Dow and Syngenta (a merger of the seed divisions of Novartis and Astra 
Zeneca).  These genetic firms were able to capture their dominant position after intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) were given to firms and products of biotechnology were becoming 
commercially available.  In theory, IPRs are important to get firms to invest in expensive 
research, since they must be assured they can receive the economic benefits of that research.  In 
food and agriculture, only the most highly capitalized firms, which include pharmaceutical firms, 
can afford such expensive research.  Smaller firms without such access to capital – or even large 
firms like Cargill – exited the seed business in the late 1990s.  
The same pattern of concentrated markets is occurring in the “protein sector” where the 
markets for meat and dairy have CR4s that range from 50 to 81 percent (Hendrickson and 
Heffernan 2002).1  The largest protein firm in the world, Tyson Foods, is the largest beef and 
chicken processor with almost a third of U.S. slaughter in beef and broilers, and ranks second in 
pork processing in the United States.  Smithfield is the largest pork producer in the United States, 
with over 700,000 sows in production, and the largest pork packer – a position secured by its 
                                                 
1
 We call the combined market share of the top four firms in any particular commodity the CR4 ratio (see Constance 
and Heffernan, 1994). 
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recent acquisition of Farmland Foods processing capacity.2  Cargill’s Excel meat processing 
company ranks second in beef processing and fourth in pork packing. ConAgra, until recently a 
large player in the protein sector, sold its pork and beef concerns to an investment firm that 
operates under the name Swift & Company, while retaining a 46 percent share in the new 
enterprise.3 In addition, ConAgra recently sold their poultry operations to Pilgrim’s Pride, 
placing that firm second in the number of broilers processed in the U.S.4 These same firms show 
up as large processors across the globe, where Smithfield is the largest pork processor in Poland 
and second largest in France, with large production facilities on the ground in Brazil and Mexico.  
Cargill is a large meat processor in both Canada and Australia.   
Major grain crops exemplify the same trend.  In the US, four firms – Cargill, Cenex 
Harvest States, ADM and General Mills – control 60 percent of the terminal grain handling 
facilities,5 while Cargill and ADM (combined with Zen-Noh) export 81 percent of US Corn and 
65 percent of US soybeans.6  In addition, 61 percent of the flour milling is controlled by four 
firms, including ADM, ConAgra and Cargill, and 80 percent of the soybeans are crushed by the 
top four, including ADM, Cargill and Bunge (Hendrickson and Heffernan 2002).  Bunge became 
the largest oilseed processor in the world with its purchase of Cereol in late 2002, and it is the 
dominant firm, along with ADM and Cargill, in soybean processing in Brazil.  In addition, 
commodity traders will verify that almost all the grain that moves between nations passes 
through Cargill, ADM or Bunge.  
                                                 
2
 Farmland, once the nation’s largest farmer-owned cooperative, filed for bankruptcy in 2002 (Hollingsworth, 
2002), an example of the difficulties of competing with well-organized and well-financed private firms. 
3
 Feedstuffs  9/23/02. 
4
 Feedstuffs , 6/16/03. 
5
 Grain and Milling Annual, 2002.  Cargill and Cenex-Harvest States are now involved in a joint grain marketing 
venture. 
6
 farmindustrynews.com, March 2001. 
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II.2. The formation of food chain clusters 
Concentration in commodity markets has some historical tendencies – e.g., the 
dominance of a few packers in the 1920s gave rise to federal anti-trust legislation in agriculture.  
In addition to agricultural commodity markets losing their competitive nature, we are seeing the 
emergence of integrated food chain clusters that dominate food and agriculture from genes to the 
shelf.  Heffernan et al (1999) diagramed three of these emerging clusters.  While careful to note 
the dynamic nature of the food and agriculture system, and the potential changes that could arise, 
the authors documented an emerging new structure in food and agriculture.  The basic 
conclusion of this report, and another one produced by Hendrickson, Heffernan, Howard, and 
Heffernan (2001), was that economic power in food and agriculture – and thus the power to 
make decisions about where and what food is produced, who grows it, and where it is marketed – 
was moving toward a few global firms embedded in a web of relationships in food production, 
from genetics to grocery retailing. 
The clusters identified in 1999 were Cargill/Monsanto, ConAgra and Novartis/ADM (see 
Figures 1-3).  The clusters started with access to genetic material – the seed firms – and worked 
down through grain and animal procurement, processing and food manufacturing.  Although the 
clusters have changed, integrated clusters dominate agriculture and food production around the 
world.7  For instance, ConAgra has exited much of the middle by selling its meat and poultry 
lines and agricultural input concerns like United AgriProduts.  Similarly, the Novartis/ADM 
cluster has undergone significant changes with ADM buying Farmland’s grain operations, 
Novartis combining seed and chemical operations with AstraZeneca, and IBP ceasing to exist as 
a stand-alone company.  Cargill has developed joint ventures with Dow and Hormel while 
                                                 
7
 For an industry perspective, Schuff (1999) and Drabenstott (1999). 
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restructuring itself to become more than a commodity trader.  Other firms, like Bunge, Tyson 
and Smithfield, are positioned to form other food chain clusters. 
 
II.3. Changes in food retailing 
While the clusters illustrated in Figures 1-3 stop with food manufacturing, food retailing 
has seen the biggest changes since the mid 1990s.  These changes are having major impacts on 
what happens to the agricultural marketplace, and by extension what happens to farms and the 
diversity of the plants and animals that make up those farms. Currently, about five to six retailing 
firms are emerging on the global level, with Wal-Mart a key contender.  Every continent has 
seen the penetration of the giants of food retailing, even into the poorest of the poor regions 
(Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003; Reardon and Berdegué, 2002).  As these firms gain market 
power, they will be able to dictate not only price but also production practices back to the 
processors and producer-farmers through the supply chain.  Moreover, these firms will be able to 
specify the genetics of the grains, fruits, vegetables and meats that they sell given their 
relationship with the final consumer (Marsden, 2003). 
The significance of the changes in food retailing for production is in the restructuring of 
supply and distribution networks, and in the development of standards enforced by retailers 
(Reardon and Berdegué, 2002).  While food manufacturers have sometimes embraced 
consolidation because it decreases transaction costs, it also distorts power in the chain and puts 
the food retailers “in a position to demand so much more from food processors” (Stanton 1999: 
36).  Burch and Goss (1999:347) observe that the increasing consolidation of the retail sector 
“has had significant effects right through to the farm sector, transforming the demands placed on 
Australian growers and processors…,” a transformation that “has shifted the degree to which 
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producers can respond to changes within global relations of production.”  No matter how big 
Tyson or ConAgra, they must go through a food retailer to ultimately reach consumers.  The 
more consumers that are funneled through one entity (such as Wal-Mart), the more powerful that 
entity becomes in being able to set its own prices to pay suppliers.  
 
III. Implications for Farmer Behavior and Farm level decision making 
Although industrialization has resulted in substantial increases in agricultural 
productivity over the last century, its effect has created downward pressures on farm prices even 
as input costs have increased consistent with inflationary norms.  The downward pressure on 
prices resulting from increased productivity causes what Cochrane (1958) termed a 
“technological treadmill.”  As Thompson (1998:108) clarified, “agricultural technology 
increased farm productivity, but this in turn lowers prices, forcing individual fa rmers to run 
faster just to stay in place.”  The industrialization of agriculture and the resulting technological 
treadmill on which farmers are being forced to run is a result of technological change and social 
preferences for low cost, high quality food.  According to Burkhardt (1991:321): 
“The historical analogies are clear: nearly every efficiency-increasing innovation in 
technology over the past 100 years that has been introduced into agriculture and widely 
adopted by agricultural producers has contributed to the industrialization and 
concentration of agricultural production.  The predominant judgment on the part of the 
agricultural establishment (including farmers), as well as the implicit judgment on the 
part of consumers, has been that increased productivity, yields, and cheap and available 
food are the prime concern.  Economics appears to dictate that this will be best (or only) 
achieved by high-tech, large-scale agricultural operations, so that technologies favoring 
this structure have been and probably will continue to be introduced into agriculture.” 
 
There is no evidence that these economic pressures are expected to subside. The 
implication is that farmers will face greater economic pressures over time to decrease the costs of 
production by adopting new technologies and increasing farm size or to increase their revenues 
    8 
no matter how this is done.  In and of itself, this will have important consequences on farmers, 
farm-level decision-making and the behavior of farmers. 
However, in addition to economic pressures, there is another important implication of 
industrialization, reflecting the issues of who makes the decisions about what is produced and 
consumed and whether the question of who makes these decisions matters at all.  The discussion 
above suggests that a relatively small number of firms, which continues to decrease, make a 
growing number of the major decisions in the food system – in the United States and around the 
world.  Moreover, decisions about who produces our food, what food is produced, how it is 
produced and who gets to eat that food have been steadily moving from the more public realm of 
households and governments to the more private realm of corporation boardrooms.  As the 
structure of the marketplace has changed for farmers, the decisions they can make about what 
plants and animals to use in their farming operation are being severely constrained.  This effect is 
destined to have a huge impact on agricultural activity.   
For example, consider the case of the U.S. broiler industry.  Poultry production is almost 
entirely coordinated with production (Hinrichs and Welsh 2003), which means that the vast 
majority of broilers produced in the United States move through one of the 40 integrating firms 
in operation, including the three largest, Tyson, Pilgrim’s Pride, and Gold Kist (a cooperative).  
Importantly, production standards for broilers – from the type of building constructed to feed for 
the birds to treatment of illness – are specified by the integrating firm.  The integrating firm 
determines when chicks will arrive in the growers’ barns, when they will be picked up, and how 
much the farmer will receive for his or her efforts.  The feed ration is devised by the firm, and 
delivered to the farm on a regular basis.  If chicks are sick, the grower needs to call the field 
representative of the integrating firm to determine the problem and devise a solution.  In fact, if a 
    9 
grower suspects that the firm has given him sick chickens or bad feed, he cannot confirm his 
suspicions by testing the feed, which is owned by the integrating firm.  
While the broiler industry is the most integrated in the United States, hogs have nearly 
mirrored the structure of poultry in recent years, with the majority of hogs now produced under 
production or marketing contracts (Welsh, Hubbell, and Carpentier, 2003).  In addition, cattle are 
mostly finished and marketed through marketing contracts, and more and more crops are grown 
with bundled seed, fertilizer, chemical and marketing arrangements.  Even without these 
disempowering contracts, Levins (2001) argues that concentrated markets mean farmers have 
little choice where to sell and how to produce what they sell. 
What are some of the implication of farmers having “little choice?” 
 
III.1. Loss of knowledge, skills 
One implication of constrained choice is the loss of agricultural production knowledge.  
As an illustration, when farmers specialize in the production of one crop or in producing one sort 
of animal, knowledge is lost as farmers rely on standardized inputs to produce their commodity 
(Kloppenburg, 1991). Indeed, one could argue that knowledge is lost all along the way from field 
to mouth – in tastes, in cooking skills, in managing biodiversity.  In producing food in such a 
way, agriculture has been subjected to the same discipline and control as manufacturing and 
industry despite arguments that agriculture has natural or biological limits that does not lend food 
and fiber production to the manufacturing paradigm (Lockie, 2002). 
Within this context, a recent study of Missouri farmers by James (2003) found that 
farmers often bemoan the fact that farms have become less diversified because of economic 
pressures to shed hog operations and scale back cattle businesses in order to concentrate 
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principally on corn, soybeans and wheat.  Many crop farmers feel they should specialize in crops 
not only because they are losing money in livestock but also because low profit margins in grain 
require them to devote more acreage to crops in order to maintain income levels.  Such 
specialization is expected as market pressures increase, but the impact of the change is felt much 
deeper for the farmer.  Some enjoyed the physical labor associated with working with animals in 
contrast to the monotony of driving a tractor up and down acres and acres of farmland.  Others 
felt they have a moral imperative to have livestock on a farm, particularly if they were raised on 
farms that used animal labor, but the moral imperative could not be reconciled with the fact that 
it was financially difficult to sustain a livestock business.  Specializing in crops rather than 
having diversified farms with crops and livestock also changes the way many farmers work and 
manage their finances.  The cash flow from a hog business, for instance, could smooth farmer 
incomes throughout the year.  Now, farmers must either borrow money throughout the year or 
take on second or third jobs during the “down time” in winter to generate additional family 
income.  
 
III.2. Loss of genetic diversity 
Changes in the structure of food and agriculture have also had important impacts on farm 
level ecological diversity.  As the marketplace for farm products has consolidated, farms have 
grown larger and more specialized.  For genetic diversity and ecological systems as a whole, this 
should be a grave concern.  For instance, some authors argue that the US Midwest now 
represents a large ecological sacrifice area (Jackson and Jackson, 2001) with farms consisting of 
nothing but corn, beans, and confined animal feeding operations.  Research carried out by 
students at Iowa State University showed that Iowa farms were much more diversified in the 
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early part of the last century.  In 1935, seven different commodities were produced on at least 50 
percent of Iowa farms; by 1997 this was reduced to two – corn and beans (see Table 1).  A 
similar story can be told in Missouri where only 5 percent of farms were producing hogs & pigs 
in 1997, down from 43 percent in 1964, and only 4 percent of farms were dairying, down from 
39 percent in 1964.8  
 
Table 1: Farm specialization in Iowa from 1935 to 1997 
 
US Census of 
Agriculture 1935 1954 1978 1997 
Commodities that 
were produced on 
at least 50% of 
more of Iowa Farms 
Cattle, Horses, Chickens, Corn, 
Hogs, Hay, Potatoes, Apples, 
Oats 
Corn, Cattle, Oats, 
Chickens, Hogs, Hay 
Corn, 
Soybeans, 
Cattle, Hay, 
Hogs 
Corn, 
Soybeans 
Commodities that 
were produced on 
between 15% and 
50%  of Iowa 
Farms 
Cherries, Grapes, Plums, 
Sheep, Peaches, Pears 
Horses, Soybeans, 
Potatoes and Sheep 
Oats Hay, Cattle, 
Hogs 
Commodities that 
were produced on 
between 1% and 
15% of Iowa Farms 
Mules, Ducks, Wheat, Geese, 
Sorghum, Barley, Red Clover, 
Strawberries, Soybeans, 
Raspberries, Bees, Timothy, 
Turkey, Rye, Popcorn, Sweet 
Corn, Sweet Clover, Goats  
Ducks, Apples, Cherries, 
Peaches, Goats, Grapes, 
Pears, Plums, Wheat, Red 
Clover, Geese, Popcorn, 
Timothy, Sweet Potatoes, 
Sweet Corn, Turkeys 
Horses, 
Chickens, 
Sheep, Wheat, 
Goats, Ducks 
Oats, 
Horses, 
Sheep, 
Chickens 
Goats 
Source: Carolan, Michael. 2001. Iowa State University, Department of Sociology. 
 
 
III.3. Increased capitalization requirements and farm debt loads 
As scale, specialization and standardization have taken hold in food production, the use 
of inputs and their costs have soared.  Manufacturing requires large sums of capital, something 
the cooperative movement recognized long ago.  Those who can obtain capital, and those who 
have access to capital at a lower cost, are in a more advantageous position relative to those who 
                                                 
8
 Calculated from US Department of Agriculture, 1977 Census of Agriculture, Missouri State and County Data, vol. 
1, Geographic Area Series, Part 25, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Table 1, pages 10-11, 
available at http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/census97/volume1/mo -25/mo1_01.pdf. 
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cannot.  Cargill, for instance, expects to double their net worth every 5-7 years, which reflects an 
annual return on investment of approximately 12 percent.  Moreover, these kinds of firms 
seeking capital have better access to other investment channels, giving them a significant 
advantage over community-based farmers or other businesses. 
For farmers making decisions at the farm level, access to capital at competitive rates is 
key, particularly as economies of scale and incentives to specialize require farmers to increase 
the size of their operations in order to remain competitive.  Such economic pressures, coupled 
with increasing land values, mean that farmers will have to increase the amount of debt they 
carry.9  However, capitalization and the resulting debt can constrain the decisions that farmers 
make both directly and indirectly. First, as farm debt increases, some farmer decision might be 
dictated by lender requirements.  Second, increasing debt could also affect the types of farming 
decisions a farmer can make.  For instance, a farmer from Nebraska made the following 
comments about raising Round-up Ready soybeans:10 
‘If I have to buy this land, and be more financially leveraged, I don’t have the luxury of 
not planting RR soybeans.  While I may make more money on non-RR beans, I have 
more risk with them.  With RR beans, I know how much it’s going to cost – Monsanto 
will reimburse if you have to spray more than twice – and about how much I’m going to 
make…. Basically, I don’t have a choice.’   
 
‘If I have the much land, and have to get the crop in, I’m going to have to start working in 
the fall – I think I’m going to even apply fertilizer then…. Hell, if [others] don’t care 
about water quality, why should I?’   
 
                                                 
9
 For instance, according to the US Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service, “Farm business debt is 
expected to rise about 2.5 percent in 2004, compared with 3.6 percent in 2003 and 4.1 percent in 2002. Total farm 
business debt is expected to approach $206 billion by the end of 2004” (online Briefing Room: Farm Income and 
Costs:  Assets, Debts, and Wealth, at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmIncome/wealth.htm, accessed June 7, 
2004.).  The trend of increasing farm business debt, coupled with the declining trend in the number of U.S. farms, 
indicates that the per farm debt is increasing substantially.  
10
 Personal conversation with Bob Hendrickson, January 12, 2004. 
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Thus, debt is a key constraining factor for most farmers.  Many Missouri farmers, for 
instance, have indicated that they would like to try alternatives in agriculture, but they don’t feel 
they can make a living with these alternatives.11  Closer probing indicates that often it is 
servicing the debt accrued in commodity production that constrains their ability to live on the 
profits from smaller scale, less intensive agricultural operations.   
For instance, in contract livestock production, debt constrains producers who have 
borrowed heavily to finance construction of highly specified production facilities that cannot 
even be used for producing for other integrating firms let alone other livestock.  Farmers have to 
rely on the contract – normally three months to one year – that is offered to them by the initial 
integrator.12  Bucking the integrating firm’s production standards is not an option for farmers 
stuck with 10-year loans on buildings that are a quarter of a million dollar investment.  In crop 
production, high prices for cash rent across the Midwest, combined with increasing input prices 
for patented seeds, chemicals, fertilizers and equipment, mean that farmers have to know they 
can market their crops in order to pay off the operating loans.  Thus, few farmers try crops like 
oats, sunflowers, sorghum or other things that may work into a useful rotation but lack accessible 
markets.  Most farmers must rent at least a portion of their crop land which also makes it difficult 
for them to try alternative crops or crop rotations without landlord approval (Levins 1999). 
 
III.4. Erosion of farmer ethics 
The concentrated and industrialized nature of agricultural markets has not only increased 
the competitive pressures farmers face, but also resulted in farmers having fewer production and 
                                                 
11
 Personal conversations with members of Missouri Farmers Union and Organization for Competitive Markets, 
April 29, April 30 and May 1, 2000. 
12
 For a good description of the economics of poultry contract production, see Taylor (2002). 
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marketing options for their crops and livestock.  Loss of competitive markets for their outputs 
has made participation in emerging food chain clusters more attractive for farmers even given 
tighter controls on production standards.  Indeed, increasing consolidation at the retail level 
means that more production standards are being dictated to the farm level by food manufactures 
and agricultural processors trying to please their clients.  Moreover, increasingly concentrated 
input markets means it is much more difficult for farmers to obtain non-genetically modified 
seeds or heritage breeds.  For instance, when 80 percent of the soybean crop in a state is planted 
to Round-up ready soybeans,13 obtaining conventional soybean seed is difficult, if not 
impossible, and the same holds true with “heritage” breeds of poultry or hogs that are no longer 
used in integrated production chains.  
We argue that constraints on the choices farmers can make might also result in an erosion 
of farmer ethics.  Scholars have recognized the importance of understanding the ethical behavior 
of farmers.  For example, Thompson (1998, p. 95) said the  
current generation of adults may believe that rural residents, particularly farmers, are 
more likely to exhibit ethically praiseworthy conduct and more likely to base action and 
decision on ethical principles. In one manifestation, agrarian ideology has maintained the 
notion that farm families are more likely to be guided by principles of ethics than are 
others, and that because farming is morally significant, agriculture should be given 
special consideration in matters of public policy.  
 
Nevertheless, “those who … farm increasingly tend to see their operations as a business and 
resent the suggestion that they should be held up as moral exemplars” (Thompson, 1998, pp. 
183-184).   
Importantly, there is evidence that farmer ethics is eroding.  For example, Farm Futures 
magazine surveyed its readers in 1990 to evaluate the ethical perceptions of farmers.  The survey 
“contained information on perceptions of the state of farm ethics, reasons for that state, multiple 
                                                 
13 See Jody Powell, “Seeds of controversy,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, 5/18/04. 
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ethical choice and problem situations, values and opinions, and personal information including 
church attendance, farm type, sales and profit levels, and current degree of satisfaction with 
farming” (Rappaport and Himschoot, 1994).  The results, reported by Knorr (1991) and 
Rappaport and Himschoot (1994), show that farmers believe the ethics of agricultural producers 
have declined during the previous 10 years and that “their own ethics have also deteriorated” 
(Knorr, 1991, p. 11).  The study also found that “respondents believe the ethical decisions they 
face are more difficult than those faced by an earlier generation” (Knorr, 1991, p. 11).  
Although there might be many explanations for the erosion of farmer ethics, we consider 
it to be strongly attributed to the industrialization and concentration of agriculture production and 
the resulting increase in decision-making constraints and economic pressures such changes have 
produced.  If industrialization is resulting in an erosion of farmer ethics, then that will have 
significant implications not only on the general public’s perceptions of farmers but also on the 
way in which the “business” of agricultural occurs.   
We present insights from social psychology and economics to show how and why 
constraints placed on the choices of farmers could result in an erosion of farmer ethics. 
 
III.4a. Self- identity and moral behavior 
According to social psychologists, group and self identity are prime movers for behavior, 
such as moral behavior.  Furthermore, changes in one’s sense of identity will have an effect on 
the behavior of individuals.  For instance, Monroe (2001) argues that identity formation and the 
innate need of individuals for consistency and self-esteem help explain why some people in 
Europe aided Jews during World War II and why others did not.  According to Monroe, 
identity [refers] to the sense, developed early in childhood, of oneself as both an agent 
and as a kind of object that is seen, thought about, and liked or disliked by others.  
    16 
Identity is complex and multivariate, and it is critical for an individual – and the world – 
to have a sense over time that the individual who is here today is also the individual who 
will be there tomorrow.  Longitudinal congruence provides a key source of an 
individual’s psychic comfort and the maintenance of identity …. Consistency thus plays 
an important role in identity maintenance and becomes crucial to identity. (500) 
 
In the case of the moral issue of helping Jews during World War II, Monroe’s (2001:496) 
research illustrated “the extent to which the decision to rescue – or not to rescue – Jews was 
described as a reflection of identity, of the kind of person one was.”  
Thus, one’s sense of identity will likely have an affect on the moral behavior of 
individuals.  This is important if constraints in the decision-making abilities of farmers created 
by industrialization result in changes in farmer self-perceptions of who they are – independent 
farmers working the land with freedom to choose their own paths or cogs in an agro- industrial 
machine.  If a farmer’s sense of self- identity changes, the implication is that their responses to 
ethical dilemmas they inevitably face might also change, for the worse.  
 
III.4b. Economics of constrained choice on ethical behavior 
A fundamental tenet of economics is that behavior is affected by two factors – 
preferences and constraints.  Preferences reflect what decision-making outcomes an economic 
agent desires, while constraints reflect what decision options are available.  Both are necessary in 
order to understand the choices an economic agent makes.  Moreover, factors that restrict the 
choices available to decision makers will alter their behavior and influence the aggregate welfare 
of society by encouraging people to make choices they otherwise would not have made.  Thus, a 
change in constraints, such as the number and types of options available to farmers, will likely 
affect their behavior somehow.  The question we are concerned with is whether such changes in 
behavior have ethical implications. 
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We present a simple economic model to illustrate how constraints in the options or choice 
set available to farmers could result in an increase in the unethical conduct of farmers.  Suppose 
a farmer has a set of n options, defined as {S1, S2, … Sn}, where S1, S2, … Sn represent available 
ethical options, and suppose that the farmer could earn an amount mS1 (measured in money) by 
choosing S1, amount mS2 by choosing S2, and so forth, to amount mSn by choosing Sn, where 
mS1>mS2>…>mSn, so that S1 is preferred to S2 which is preferred to S3 and so forth.  Suppose 
further that the farmer can also engage in a variety of unethical actions, which we label D, in 
order to increase his income.  Consider now panel (a) in Figure 4.14  On the x-axis we measure 
the amount of money the farmer could generate (from ethical and/or unethical actions).  On the 
y-axis we represent the farmer’s personal ethical standards, proclivities, and behavior, measured 
by e, where a high e indicates behavior that is “very ethical” while a smaller e represents a lower 
degree of ethical conduct.  We assume that eM represents behavior that is “fully” ethical (i.e., so 
the y-axis reaches a maximum at eM).  For example, someone who never tells a lie would have a 
value of e equal to eM, if honesty is the defined measure of personal ethics.  For simplicity we 
also assume that ethical judgments can be represented along a single graphical scale (e.g., 
ranging from "low" to "high").  This could be justified as follows:  According to the empirical 
evidence, there has been an “erosion” of farmer ethics.  This suggests a decrease from some 
“higher” level of personal ethical proclivities or behaviors to a “lower” level, consistent with a 
linear graphical representation.  To consider another example, deception is widely considered to 
be an ethical problem.  Nevertheless, there are different types of lies and different motivations 
for lying that range from altruistic to individualistic to exploitive (Linskold and Water, 1983).  
Suppose D entails choices involving deception, which is measured graphically along the vertical 
                                                 
14
 This figure is an adaptation of Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman (2001, Figures 2.7 and 2.8). 
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axis of Figure 4 by e, which represents the degree of honesty chosen by the agent in a particular 
context, where honesty is understood to be the inverse of deception or the telling of lies.  A low e 
might represent the telling of exploitive lies, with increasing e's representing the telling of 
individualistic lies, then altruistic lies, and finally no lies (in which case e=eM), respectively. 
The straight line in Figure 4 is a “constraint” in that it represents how much additional 
money the farmer can earn by behaving unethically.  In essence, this line defines the relative 
price of ethics.  The flatter the constraint, the greater is the relative price of behaving ethically, 
or, conversely, the greater will be the (monetary) gains from engaging in unethical behavior.  For 
instance, if eM represents behavior that is fully ethical, and mS1 is the amount of money earned 
from the most preferred ethical option (S1), then if the farmer want to increase money from mS1 
to m1, that will require a decrease in his ethical standards represented by movement from eM to 
e1.   
The curved line represents the combination of ethics and money chosen by the farmer 
that produces constant utility (i.e., it is an isoutility or indifference curve).  As such, it represents 
his “preferences” between ethics and money.  Point A represents the farmer’s choice of personal 
ethics and money earned that maximizes his utility.  We can represent an increase in utility by 
shifting the curved isoutility line outward; conversely, a movement toward the origin of the 
isoutility curve will indicate a lower level of utility. 
As discussed above, an important implication of industrialization is a constraint in the 
decision options available to farmers.  If the option that is restricted is the most preferred 
“ethical” option, then we can show that the effect of this is a greater incentive for the farmer to 
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engage in unethical conduct.15  We show this as follows:  Suppose option S1 is removed as a 
choice option so that the farmer’s ethical decision set is constrained to be {S2 and S3}.  This has 
the effect of shifting to the left the “constraint” line reflecting the relative price of ethics, as 
shown in panel (b) of Figure 4, because S2 is now the “most preferred” ethical option, with 
income earned from this option equal to mS2.  This will result in an erosion in ethics as the 
farmer adjusts his personal ethical standards downward from e1 to e2, other things being equal, 
by moving from point A to point B.  Interestingly, the farmer is on a lower isoutility curve, 
indicating that he is relatively worse off because of the constrained choice.  Simply, other things 
being equal, the farmer would “prefer” (i.e., be better off) not having the constraint in choices 
and not lowering his personal ethical standards.  The farmer’s erosion of ethics, however, is a 
“rational” response to the imposition of a restriction in his ability to select option S1. 
 
IV. Conclusions  
We have shown that as markets become increasingly concentrated, the decisions that 
farmers can make about what to produce and where to sell are becoming constrained.  For 
instance, globally emerging food chains, dominated by transnational food retailers, determine 
many farm-level decisions, in that they shape the markets for inputs, including seeds and breeds, 
as well as outputs, including livestock and grains.  We have also shown that constrained decision 
choices can lead to an erosion in ethical behavior of farmers.  Constrained choices for farmers 
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 Interestingly, experimental evidence from psychology suggests that a reduction in the number of options 
available to a decision-maker will increase the likelihood that less preferred options will be selected in ways that 
could have implications for ethical behavior.  For instance, Glazer, Kahn, and Moore (1991) show that when three 
options are available to decision makers – S1, S2, and D – where S1 is preferred to S2, and S1 and S2 are similar 
but D is substantially different from the other two options, removing S1 from the choice set not only increases the 
probability that S2 is chosen but also increases the probability that D is selected.  Suppose S1 and S2 are ethically 
appropriate actions, while D is an available but ethically inappropriate action.  The experimental evidence suggests 
that constraining farmers to a choice between S2 and D, for instance, could increase the likelihood that the 
ethically inappropriate action, D, is selected. 
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will likely mean more and more unethical decisions regarding land, seeds, and labor.  
Agriculture is emerging as a place where ethically compromised positions could become natural 
for farmers, and perhaps mirror other businesses that have had ethical failures in recent years.  
With food as a basic builder of life, and with the potential for large scale environmental impacts 
from farming, it is perhaps time to turn attention to the ethical attitudes, proclivities, and 
behaviors of farmers. 
    21 
References 
Brickley, James A., Clifford Smith, Jr., and Jerold L. Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and 
Organizational Architecture, 2/e, Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2001. 
Burch, D and J. Goss, “Global sourcing and retail chains: Shifting relationships of production in 
Australian agri- foods,” Rural Sociology 64 (2), 1999, 334-350. 
Burkhardt, Jeffrey, “Biotechnology, Ethics, and the Structure of Agriculture,” in C.V. Blatz 
(ed.), Ethics and Agriculture: An Anthology on Current Issues in World Context, 
Moscow, ID: University of Idaho Press, 1991, 317-330. 
Carolan, Michael, “Audubon County Food System Atlas,” project of Department of Sociology at 
Iowa State University. 2001, p. 9, available online at 
http://www.soc.iastate.edu/chinrichs/foodsystems.html 
Cochrane, Willard W., Farm Prices: Myth and Reality, Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1958. 
Constance, Douglas and William D. Heffernan, “Corporations and the Globalization of the Food 
System,” in A. Bonanno, L. Busch, W. Friedland, L. Gouveia, and E. Mingione (eds.), 
From Columbus to ConAgra, Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1994, 29-51. 
Drabenstott, Mark, “Consolidation in U.S. agriculture leading to new rural landscape and public 
policy considerations,” Feedstuffs, May 17, 1999, 33-37. 
Glazer, Rashi, Barbara E. Kahn, and William L. Moore, “The Influence of External Constraints 
on Brand Choice:  The Lone-Alternative Effect,” Journal of Consumer Research, 18(1), 
1991, 119-127. 
Heffernan, William D., Mary Hendrickson and Robert Gronski, Consolidation in the Food and 
Agriculture System, Research Report, Washington DC: National Farmers Union, 1999. 
Hendrickson, Mary and William Heffernan, “Concent ration of Agricultural Markets,” University 
of Missouri, Department of Rural Sociology, February, 2002 
Hendrickson, M., W. D. Heffernan, P. H. Howard and J. B. Heffernan, “Consolidation in Food 
Retailing and Dairy,” British Food Journal, 3(10), 2001, 715-728. 
Hinrichs, C. Clare and Rick Welsh, “The Effects of the Industrialization of US Livestock 
Agriculture on Promoting Sustainable Production Practices,” Agriculture and Human 
Values, 20, 2003, 125-141. 
Hollingsworth, Heather, “Farmland Industries Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, ” Associated 
Press State & Local Wire, May 31, 2002. 
    22 
James, Harvey S., Jr., “The Ethical Challenges of Farming, or Farming for Ethics,” paper 
presented at the IAREH Fifth International Symposium, Future of Rural Peoples, 
Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada, October 19-23, 2003. 
Jackson, Dana L. and Laura L. Jackson, The Farm as Natural Habitat, Washington, DC: Island 
Press, 2001. 
Kloppenburg, Jack, “Social Theory and the De/reconstruction of Agricultural Science: Local 
Knowledge for an Alternative Agriculture,” Rural Sociology, 56(4), 1991, 519-548. 
Knorr, Bryce, “Ethics: The American Farmer,” Farm Futures, January 1991, 10-13. 
Levins, Richard, “Will 'Kervorkian Economics' Destroy Family Farms?” Leopold Letter of the 
Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture, Vol. 11, Number 4, 1999. 
Levins, Richard, “An Essay on Farm Income,” Staff Paper Series, Department of Applied 
Economics, College of Agricultural, Food, and Environmental Sciences, University Of 
Minnesota. April 2001. 
Linskold, S., and P.S. Walters, "Categories for Acceptability of Lies," Journal of Social 
Psychology, 120, 1983, pp. 129-136. 
Lockie, Stewart. “‘The invisible mouth’: Mobilizing ‘the Consumer’ in Food Production-
Consumption Networks,” Sociologia Ruralis, 42(4), 2002, 278-294. 
Marsden, Terry, “Retailer Power in the UK and EU: Impact on Producers in Brazil,” invited 
presentation, Food in a Failed Market, Grassroots Action on Food and Farming, Reading, 
United Kingdom, April 30, 2003. 
Monroe, Kristen Renwick, “Morality and a Sense of Self:  The Importance of Identity and 
Categorization for Moral Action,” American Journal of Political Science, 45(3), 2001, 
491-507. 
Rappaport, Allen, and Robert A. Himschoot, “Ethics Perceptions of American Farmers: An 
Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Business Ethics, 13(10), 1994, 795-802. 
Reardon, T. and J.A. Berdegué, “The Rapid Rise of Supermarkets in Latin America: Challenges 
and Opportunities for Development,” Development Policy Review, 20(4), 2002, 317-34. 
Schuff, Sally, “Economist Says Supply Chains will Redraw Map,” Feedstuffs, October 25, 1999, 
1. 
Stanton, John, “Support the Independent Grocer – or Else,” Food Processing, 60(2), 1999, 36. 
Taylor, C. Robert, “Restoring Economic Health to Contract Poultry Production, ” Agricultural 
and Resource Policy Forum, Auburn University College of Agriculture, May 2002. 
    23 
Thompson, Paul B., Agricultural Ethics: Research, Teaching, and Pub lic Policy, Ames, IA: Iowa 
State University Press, 1998. 
Weatherspoon, D. and T. Reardon, “The rise of supermarkets in Africa: Implications for agrifood 
systems and the rural poor,” Development Policy Review, 21(3), 2003, 1-20. 
Welsh, Rick, Bryan Hubbell and Chantal Line Carpentier, “Agro-food system restructuring and 
the geographic concentration of US swine production,” Environment and Planning A, 35, 
2003, 215-229. 
 
    24 
 
Figure 1. Cargill/Monsanto food-chain cluster, from Heffernan, Hendrickson, and Gronski 
(1999). 
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Figure 2.  ConAgra food chain-cluster, from Heffernan, Hendrickson, and Gronski (1999). 
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Figure 3. Novartis/ADM food chain-cluster, from Heffernan, Hendrickson, and Gronski (1999). 
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 (a)      (b) 
 
Figure 4.  Example of the effect of constrained choice on the ethics of a farmer.  The figure 
shows how the removal of a choice option (S1) induces the decision-maker to lower his ethical 
standards.  Adapted from Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman (2001, Figures 2.7 and 2.8).  
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